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Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10228

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AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-133

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## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM :  
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/00/1975  
PAGES : 81

SUBJECTS :

BISSELL, RICHARD  
LUMUMBA, ASSASSINATION  
CIA

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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AGENCY INFORMATION

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CIA

BISSELL, RICHARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
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OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : CC Box 133

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CONGO



PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
HARVEY, William  
O'DONNELL, Justin  
BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA ✓

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he worked with a man called JUSTIN O'DONNELL in Staff. O'DONNELL stated that O'DONNELL came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA. HARVEY testified that O'DONNELL told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL stated that he had requested O'DONNELL to undertake such an operation. (9-10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency in connection with any proposals to eliminate LUMUMBA. (10)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975 (pp. 9-10)

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Congo ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On May 21, 1975 in an affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission Mr. Douglas Dillon stated that in late July or early August of 1960 he attended a meeting in the Pentagon in which the overall Congo problem was discussed. He stated: "During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding a possibility of an assassination attempt against Lamumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Affidavit dated May 21, 1975 of Mr. C. Douglas Dillon to the  
Rockefeller Commission

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard  
 ROSTOW, Walt  
 O'DONNELL  
 LUMUMBA

DATES:

1960(?)

CONGO

CATEGORIES: TOP SECR

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he told WALT ROSTOW that he had taken the initiative to instruct O'DONNELL to plan for the assassination of LUMUMBA (55).

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: BISSELL, II

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard  
 O'DONNELL, Justin  
 LUMUMBA  
 GOTTLIEB, Sidney

DATES:  
1960(?)

CONGO

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he asked JUSTIN O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of killing LUMUMBA. (54) BISSELL does not remember the date.

BISSELL told this to O'DONNELL in connection with making plans to see SIDNEY GOTTLIEB.  
 (Note: From this transcript, it is impossible to tell whether these were BISSELL's plans to see GOTTLIEB or O'DONNELL's plans.)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: BISSELL, II, p.54

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>   | <u>DATES:</u> | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>  |
|--|---------------|---|
| BISSELL, Richard<br>O'DONNELL<br>LUMUMBA, Patrice<br>WHITE HOUSE | 1960(?)       | TOP SECRET<br>CONGO - Authorization for Assassination<br>Plotting Against LUMUMBA ✓ |

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that no one authorized him to tell O'DONNELL to take steps toward assassinating LUMUMBA. (54) He did not inform the WHITE HOUSE and, to the best of his knowledge, no one informed the WHITE HOUSE that this assignment had been made. (54) BISSELL said that the initiative probably came from himself. (55) BISSELL emphasizes that he did not "seek to assassinate" (55) LUMUMBA, but rather "told a member of the Clandestine Service to make plans and develop the capability so to do if it were approved and ordered." (55) He recognized that it would have to "have approval at the highest level of government" (55).

**TOP SECRET**

|                           |                     |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| <u>SOURCE:</u> BISSELL II | <u>STAFF:</u> BARON |
| <u>FILE:</u>              | <u>DATE:</u> 1/2/75 |

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>                 | <u>DATES:</u> | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>    |
|--|---------------|-----------------------|
| BISSELL, Richard<br>O'DONNELL<br>LUMUMBA | 1960(?)       | TOP SECRET<br>CONGO ✓ |

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that O'DONNELL told him that he did not want to investigate the possibility of assassinating LUMUMBA and said, "that he thought it was an inappropriate action, and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways." (54)

**TOP SECRET**

|                                  |                      |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|
| <u>SOURCE:</u> BISSELL, II, p.54 | <u>STAFF:</u> Baron  |
| <u>FILE:</u>                     | <u>DATE:</u> 28.6.75 |

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER  
MR. GRAY  
MR. DULLES  
LAMUMBA

DATES:

August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Lamumba ✓  
Special Group  
Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1960 the Special Group heard an outline of "three operational lines that we are following and mounting an anti-Lamumba campaign in the Congo." These lines included various political efforts and "The group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order."

There was also discussion which might be construed to refer to an assassination attempt: "Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates The President? had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE:

Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:  
August 25, 1960CATEGORIES:

Lamumba  
Special Group  
Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lamumba." (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE:

Cage

DATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Bissell  
O'DonnellDATES:

Fall 1960

CATEGORIES:

CONGO

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:  
 BISSELL testified that he "very definitely" (p. 75) asked O'DONNELL to investigate the possibility of killing LUMUMBA.

BISSELL said that this could be an example of Executive Action capability but when pressed on the contradiction between the dates of late 1960 for his conversation with O'DONNELL and May 1961 (or early 1961) for his establishment of the Executive Action capability, he said that he did not remember whether his assignment to O'DONNELL was part of the Executive Action program. (p. 76).

SOURCE:

+

FILE: Bissell testimony, SSCISTAFF:

Gordon

7/1/75

DATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:KASAVUBU  
Gov. HARRIMAN  
DULLES, J.F.DATES:September 1,  
1960CATEGORIES:Lamumba  
Special GroupOCCURRENCE:

On September 1, 1960 the Special Group discussed the suggestion to provide PRESIDENT KSAVUBU with an airplane superior to the one provided by the Soviets. MR. DULLES expressed a number of objections to the proposal.

"Mr. Merchant noted that the question of whether Governor Harriman should offer to find an advisor for Lamumba has been put up to the Secretary General of the U.N., for the decision would have to be made in the first instance."

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting September 1 1960

STAFF:

Rob Kelley

PERSONS/ENTITIES:MR. PARROTT  
MADAME BLOUINDATES:  
October 20, 1960

CONGO

Special Group

CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:

On October 20, 1960, the Special Group heard a report by MR. PARROTT "about the operation in connection with Madame Blouin, noting that her appearance in Switzerland could receive some publicity for next week's meeting."

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting Oct. 20, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: CageDATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:MR. GRAY  
MR. MERCHANT  
MR. DOUGLAS  
MR. DULLES  
LAMUMBADATES:  
Sept. 8, 1960CATEGORIES:  
Special Group  
Presidential Authorization  
Congo ✓OCCURRENCE:

On September 8, 1960 at a Special Group meeting the minutes recorded the following: "There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

No other material on the CONGO appeared in the minutes other than the above quotation.

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting Sept. 8, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
KASAVUBU                    HAMMARSKJOLD  
MOBUTU  
LAMUMBA  
MERCHANT

DATES:  
October 27, 1960

CATEGORIES:  
Special Group  
Congo✓

OCCURRENCE:

On October 27, 1960 the Special Group read a paper outlining "the proposal to aid Colonel Mobutu in working toward the eventual formation of a moderate government...".

The Special Group approved the proposal with the understanding that the program envisages complete recognition of Kasavubu as the legitimate head of state and that Mobutu would remain in the background."

Mr. Merchant reported on discussions with Hammarskjold: "He has swung away from a feeling that Lamumba must be removed, to a feeling that is the legitimate prime minister and that we much live with him although acknowledging that his title is somewhat clouded."

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 27, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL  
DULLES  
LAMUMBA

DATES:  
Nov. 10, 1960

CATEGORIES:  
Special Group  
Congo✓

OCCURRENCE:

On November 10, 1960, at the Special Group meeting "Mr. Bissell mentioned briefly that we are making certain contingency plans for the Congo against the possibility of a pro-Soviet Lamumba government, the complications arising from a militant Katanga independence movement"... Mr. Dulles said that he had discussed the Congo [redacted] during his recent visit to [redacted] had told him that they would have arms available for a contingency of this kind, and he said that the U.S. and [redacted] views on the Congo seemed quite close."

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting, Nov. 10, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL, Richard  
TWEEDY, Bronson  
WIROGUEDATES:

late 1960

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETEXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE  
GENERAL THEMES  
CONGOOCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that the philosophy described by the Chief of the CIA Africa Division, probably BRONSON TWEEDY, in a memorandum in late 1960, was probably applicable to matters within the scope of Project ZRRIFLE. The memorandum recommended the agent WIROGUE in these terms:

"He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions" (59).

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: BISSELL, IISTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:O'Donnell  
BissellTOP  
DATES:  
1961CATEGORIES:

Congo

OCCURRENCE:

"My judgment is that before Mr. O'DONNELL ever got there, the assassination plan had been decided to be inappropriate and unnecessary and had been dropped." (p. 79)

This is BISSELL'S reason for saying that he was surprised that the virus appeared in view of Mr. O'DONNELL's position of refusing to assassinate a leader.

SOURCE:

Bissell Testimony, SEC

STAFF:

Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

Bissell

1961

✓ Congo

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testifies that he does not remember ordering any virus sent down to the Congo, nor does he remember any conversations with the person in charge of producing virus capability in relation to the Congo (p. 77).

SOURCE:FILE:

Biswell I

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

Brown

DATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, RICHARD  
O'DONNELL, JUSTIN  
BISSELL  
LAMUMBA

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

LAMUMBA ✓

OCCURRENCE: HELMS was told by the committee that O'DONNELL had testified that he had come to HELMS' office and told HELMS that BISSELL had asked him to kill LAMUMBA but that he wasn't going to do it and that HELMS had agreed that he should not do it. HELMS testified that he did not recall the conversation at all (155). At that time HELMS was serving as BISSELL's number-two man, Chief of Operations. HELMS testified that he would not necessarily have known about the poison if it had been sent to the Congo because the Deputy Director could have made his own arrangements without going through his underlings (156).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Helms Testimony, 6/13/75

STAFF:

G. Rhea

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Bundy  
Bowles  
ParrottDATES:  
June 21, 1961CATEGORIES:  
Congo ✓OCCURRENCE:

On June 21, 1961, Thomas Parrott wrote a memorandum for the record, subject: "Covert Action in the Congo." The memorandum stated "the Congo paper was presented at the Special Group June 8 and deferred because of the request for an overall briefing on political action. On June 10, Mr. Bissell obtained approval for Mr. Bundy for part of the program, i.e., an expenditure of \$20-30,000 for support of Bulikango (equateur) and Bomboko. Memorandum also notes that the "parliament program" was given "full approval by Mr. Bundy and "at the Special Group meeting on June 22, Mr. Bundy stated that the Congo paper had been personally approved by the President."

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: Memorandum for the record by Thomas A. Parrott dated June 21, 1961,STAFF: Bob KelleyFILE:DATE: June 29, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:SELL, Richard  
WIN  
VEY  
RIFLEDATES:

Feb, 1961

CATEGORIES:TOP SECRET  
EXECUTIVE ACTION  
CONGO ✓OCCURRENCE:

SELL testified that he did not have any personal recollection of who QJWIN was, although says that he probably was informed at the time if HARVEY recruited him for ZRRIFLE (58).

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: BISSELL, IISTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
CONGO  
QJWIN  
LUMUMBA, Patrice  
BRECKENRIDGE, Scott  
HELMS, Richard

DATES:

2/61

LEADS

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CONGO: In discussing the recruitment of the agent QJWIN by the EXECUTIVE ACTION program "for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" (38), the ribbon copy, which is the only copy in existence, has the phrase "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" scratched out. SCOTT BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this was done by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report.

Why?

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
HELMS, RICHARD  
O'DONNELL, JUSTIN  
LAMUMBA

DATES:

O'Donnell 2/61

CATEGORIES:

LAMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: HELMS testified that he knew a CIA agent named JUSTIN O'DONNELL, HELMS stated that he did not recall having been involved in assassination attempts against LAMUMBA but he thought he might very well have been (154). HELMS did not know why LAMUMBA might have been slated for assassination, although he did remember that when LAMUMBA was alive many of his followers were opposed to the CIA and that after his death allegations were widespread in the black community that the CIA had killed LAMUMBA (154). HELMS testified that at the time of publicity about possible CIA involvement in LAMUMBA's death he recalled making inquiries to find out if there was even a remote relationship and was told there was not (155).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Helms Testimony, 6/13/75

STAFF: G.Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/29/75

|  |  |                             |
|--|--|-----------------------------|
| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>   | <u>DATES:</u>  | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>          |
| BISSELL, Richard<br>HARVEY, William<br><del>ZRIFLE</del><br>SILVER, Arnold<br>LUMUMBA, Patrice | O'DONNELL, Justin<br>BRECKENRIDGE, S.<br>HELMS, Richard<br>QJWIN | FEB.<br>May 1961<br>CONGO ✓ |
| <u>EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE</u>  |  |                             |
| <u>TOP SECRET</u>  |  |                             |

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

|   |                                       |   |
|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| <u>SOURCE:</u> I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38                | <u>STAFF:</u> Baron                   |   |
| <u>FILE:</u>  | <u>DATE:</u> 28.6.75                  |   |
| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>                              | <u>DATES:</u>                         | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>                          |
| ZRIFLE<br>QJWIN<br>SILVER, Arnold<br>LUMUMBA, Patrice | O'DONNELL, Justin<br>BISSELL, Richard | May 1961<br>February 19, 1962<br>Feb., 1961 |
| EXECUTIVE ACTION                                      |                                       |   |
| ZRRIFLE<br>LUMUMBA ✓                                  |                                       |   |

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~program~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

TOP SECRET

|  |                      |
|--|----------------------|
| <u>SOURCE:</u> I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38 | <u>STAFF:</u> Baron  |
|  | <u>DATE:</u> 28.6.75 |

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL, Richard GOTTLIEB, Sidney  
 HARVEY  
 WHITE HOUSE  
 SILVER, Arnold

DATES:

February 1961  
 (HARVEY's rough estimate)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION /  
ZURRIFLE  
CASTRO  
LUBANG CONGO

OCCURRENCE:

the

BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability, i.e., a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD SILVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

card 1 of 2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38STAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75**TOP SECRET**DATE: 28.6.75STAFF: BaronSOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38FILE:

HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).  
 HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).  
 Some time shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the concept but without mention of the then on-Gotlieb plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)  
 development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. LILLES orally on the general purpose of this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the concept but without mention of the then on-Gotlieb plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lumumba  
ColbyDATES:

2/12/61

CATEGORIES:QJ WIN  
Lumumba ✓OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified:

Q. J. Win was asset who was considered for effort to assassinate Lumumba,  
which never took place (Tr. 108)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:ZRRIFLE  
QJWIN  
SILVER, Arnold  
LUMUMBA, PatriceDATES:

May 1961

February 19, 1962

Feb., 1961

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

LUMUMBA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~program~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38STAFF: Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bowles  
Gilpatrick  
Bundy  
Dulles

DATES:

June 29, 1961

CATEGORIES:

Congo ✓  
Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On June 29, 1961, the minutes of the Special Group state: "Mr. Dulles said that we feel Gizenga will probably not come to the parliamentary session in Leopoldville unless he is sure that his forces will win. He commented that this raises a policy question as to whether an attempt should be made to stop the assembly. Mr. Bowles said that Mr. Bissell had raised this with him yesterday and that appropriate officials in the department are considering the matter."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting June 29, 1961.

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
APPROVAL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER  
MR. GRAY  
MR. DULLES  
LAMUMBA

DATES:  
August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:  
Lamumba  
Special Group  
Presidential Authorization ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1960 the Special Group heard an outline of "three operational lines that we are following and mounting an anti-Lamumba campaign in the Congo." These lines included various political efforts and "The group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order."

There was also discussion which might be construed to refer to an assassination attempt: "Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates /The President?/ had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:  
August 25, 1960

CATEGORIES:  
Lamumba  
Special Group  
Presidential Authorization

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lamumba." (emphasis added)

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting August 25, 1960

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MR. GRAY  
MR. MERCHANT  
MR. DOUGLAS  
MR. DULLES  
LAMUMBA

DATES:  
Sept. 8, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group  
Presidential Authorization ✓  
Congo

OCCURRENCE:

On September 8, 1960 at a Special Group meeting the minutes recorded the following: "There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."

No other material on the CONGO appeared in the minutes other than the above quotation.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting Sept. 8, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

DATE:

June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER  
ALLEN DULLES  
GOODPASTER, GEN.

DATES:  
Sept 29, 1960

CATEGORIES:  
MONGOOSE  
Special Group  
Presidential Authorization

*Card 1 of 3*

OCCURRENCE:

On September 29, 1960 the Special Group discussed a proposal for U-2 airplane coverage of Cuba. GENERAL GOODPASTER "told the group that the President wishes to reserve himself any decision which involves violation of the borders of a foreign country by an element of the military establishment."

After a great deal of discussion "all members of the group expressed some skepticism as to the complete justification for U-2 coverage based on agency requirements" with

There was also discussion of a proposal to permit exploration of / certain foreign intelligence services of recruitment of limited numbers of foreign nationals to bolster the Cuban paramilitary force and the proposal of using Americans as well.

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group Meeting Sept 29, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:  
Oct 6, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group  
MONGOOSE  
Presidential Authorization

*Card 2 of 3*

OCCURRENCE:

On October 6, 1960 the Special Group discussed relating to CUBA:

- (1) Explanation by MR. DULLES of the "abortive supply drop to resistance elements" in Cuba.
- (2) MR. DULLES' proposal for U-2 coverage of CUBA "All the members of the group said that they were in favor of proceeding with the coverage." Mr. Gray asked to have the memorandums on which Mr. Dulles had based his presentation forwarded to him for use in getting the required decision.

Mr. Dulles' proposal for use of American volunteers and foreign nationals in the Cuban operation. The group agreed Mr. Dulles could begin screening lists of potential candidates. Dulles "added that there might be a possibility of

SOURCE:

(Continued)  
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

STAFF:

Bob Kelley

FILE: Cage

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:

Oct. 6, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group  
MONGOOSE  
Presidential Authorization

*card 3 of 3*OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960  
FILE: Cage

STAFF:

DATE: Bob Kelley  
June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY      BUNDY  
ROBERT KENNEDY      MCNAMARA  
HELMS  
RUSK

DATES:

Nov.12,1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

At the meeting on November 12, 1963, with the President, FITZGERALD in response to a question as to what decisions remain to be made stated that "we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabatoge and harrassment." After outlining a number of large scale sabatoge operations "the concensus was that the CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nove. 12, 1963  
"Cuban Operations"

FILE:STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JOHNSON  
KILPATRICK  
MCCONE  
PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATES:

Nov. 6,1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
SPECIAL GROUP  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On November 6, 1963, higher authority (PRESIDENT KENNEDY) "disapproved all Cuban Operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before NOvember 12. Two operations dated November 8 and 10 are therefore disapproved. "

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:STAFF:

Kelley

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Dulle, Alan  
Cabell, General  
Bissell, Mr.DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:SPECIAL GROUP  
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORIZATIONOCCURRENCE:

On May 24, 1961, at a CIA deputys' meeting Mr. Dulles "stated that he was quite concerned about the way essentially 5412 projects are being handled and stated CIA is totally unprotected if we do not follow established procedures in discussing and obtaining approval of these projects before implementation."...a discussion ensued regarding the special groups relationship with the various task forces appointed on a Iran, Vietnam, Korea, and other areas together with the special groups connection with NSC actions. The Director agreed that this was a problem for the special group and asked Mr. Bissell to prepare" a memorandum for the special group meeting on May 25.

SOURCE:Memorandum dated May 24, 1961 titled  
"Deputys Meeting" (00787)STAFF:

Kelley

FILE:DATE: July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:Bundy  
President Kennedy  
**TAYLOR**[RFK]  
[RUSK]  
[McNAULKA]DATES:

Aug 23, 1962

CATEGORIES:MONGOOSE  
Presidential AuthorizationOCCURRENCE:

On August 23, 1962, McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum titled "National Security Action Memorandum #181" to the Secretary of State, Defense, Attorney General, CIA Acting Director and General Taylor stating the President had directed 8 studies and actions "to be undertaken in the light of evidence of new Bloc activity in Cuba." The memorandum included the President's direction that "The line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. Action: General Taylor." Also listed for study were various military alternatives to execute a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S. and "the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockage or invasion or other action beyond MONGOOSE B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis."

SOURCE:

National Security Memorandum #181 Aug 23, 1962

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

June 30, 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>                             | <u>DATES:</u>     | <u>CATEGORIES:</u> |                                     |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| PRESIDENT KENNEDY<br>ROBERT KENNEDY<br>HELMS<br>RUSK | BUNDY<br>MCNAMARA | Nov. 12, 1963      | MONGOOSE<br>PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓ |

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 FITZGERALD reported to the President at a meeting on disaffections in the military in Cuba, stating that while the military is loyal there are indications that some leaders might break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. The principal aim of the U.S. is to "get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the CASTRO regime to dare to talk and plot CASTRO's downfall with each other."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963  
FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>                             | <u>DATES:</u>     | <u>CATEGORIES:</u> |                                     |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| PRESIDENT KENNEDY<br>ROBERT KENNEDY<br>HELMS<br>RUSK | BUNDY<br>MCNAMARA | Nov. 12, 1963      | MONGOOSE<br>PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓ |

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 mr. FITZGERALD briefed President KENNEDY on sabotage and harrassment in operationsin Cuba describing successful operations against four installations and the belief that these operations have raised the moral of the people in Cuba and continues to keep pressure on CASTRO adding to the growing economic problems facing the country.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963  
FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

|                   |          |
|-------------------|----------|
| PRESIDENT KENNEDY | BUNDY    |
| ROBERT KENNEDY    | MCNAMARA |
| HELMS             |          |
| RUSK              |          |

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:MONGOOSE  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓OCCURRENCE:

On Nov. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United States economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"STAFF:DATE: Kelley

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

|                   |       |
|-------------------|-------|
| PRESIDENT KENNEDY | BUNDY |
| ROBERT KENNEDY    |       |
| HELMS             |       |
| RUSK              |       |
| MCNAMARA          |       |

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:MONGOOSE  
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VaNCE, Mr. HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, MR. CHIEVER, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963

STAFF:DATE: Kelley

|                              |               |                                     |
|------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>     | <u>DATES:</u> | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>                  |
| PRESIDENT KENNEDY      BUNDY |               |                                     |
| ROBERT KENNEDY               | Nov. 12, 1963 | MONGOOSE<br>PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓ |
| HELMS                        |               |                                     |
| RUSK                         |               |                                     |
| MCNAMARA                     |               |                                     |

OCCURRENCE:

On Nov. 12, 1963, at a meeting with President KENNEDY and others, Mr. FITZGERALD discussed covert collection in Cuban operations, pointing out that CIA had three kinds of agents activities inside Cuba: (1) "Singleton" operations (2) Collection nets (3) agents involved in black net operations. Some 25 agents had been either captured or killed in the past year. There is increasing effectiveness of CASTRO's internal security forces, accounting for the loss of agents.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963  
"Cuban Operations"

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

|                              |               |                                     |
|------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------------------|
| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>     | <u>DATES:</u> | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>                  |
| PRESIDENT KENNEDY      BUNDY |               |                                     |
| ROBERT KENNEDY      MCNAMARA | Nov. 12, 1963 | MONGOOSE<br>PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓ |
| HELMS                        |               |                                     |
| RUSK                         |               |                                     |

OCCURRENCE:

On November 12, 1963 FITZGERALD briefed the President on CIA propaganda activities in Cuba. He said some "30,000 to 40,000 leaflets per month had been mailed and during the day there are 32 hours of programs from seven different stations."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963  
"Cuban Operations"

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY  
 SECRETARY RUSK  
 SECRETARY MCNAMARA  
 SPECIAL GROUP MEMBERS

DATES:

May 28, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
 SPECIAL GROUP  
 PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On May 28, 1963 at a special meeting with the President, "it was decided that two-level missions using two airplanes each should be flown over Soviet military camps in Cuba."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum of record dated May 28, 1963, "low level  
FILE: reconnaissance of Cuba"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley  
 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY      MCCONE  
 SECRETARY MCNAMARA      BUNDY  
 HARRIMAN  
 FITZGERALD

DATES:

June 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE  
 SPECIAL GROUP  
 PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On June 19, 1963 the meeting was held with "higher authority" at which a program for "external sabatoge" for Cuba was approved with the understanding that operations will not begin until mid-July. The program was to be directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: -(a) electric power (b) petroleum refineries and storage facilities (c) railroad and highway transportation (d) production and manufacturing." The purpose of this and other programs is to "nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other by-products of unrest."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963  
FILE: "Sabatoge Program Cuba"

STAFF:

DATE: Kelley

GENERAL THEMES

PERSONS/ENTITIES: *Bissell* | DATES: | CATEGORIES: *General Themes*

"The device or the doctrine of plausible deniability" (5) was explained by Bissell: for any covert operation that was likely to have a visible consequence one objective was to carry out such operations "in such a way that they could be plausibly disclaimed by the U.S. government." (5)

PRESIDENTIAL DENIABILITY: "To protect the President" (5) Allen Dulles would have attempted "to have indicated to the two successive presidents the general objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the President--either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to give the President just as little information about it as possible beyond an understanding of its general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it should surface." (5-6) Bissell believed, based on "my knowledge of command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations-- is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated" (6); i.e., "circumlocutions" (6)

Bissell uses this theory of plausible deniability as his explanation for the reason that neither he nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed an assassination operation on their own initiative with members of the White House Staff. "The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been notified, and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization." (6)

SOURCE: *Bissell II*

STAFF: *BASIC*

PERSONS/ENTITIES: *Bissell* | DATES: | CATEGORIES: *General Themes*

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testif ... that the Russians have made extensive use of assassination though he was not referring to assassination of heads of state. BISSELL had no knowledge of Russian assassinations of heads of state by the KGB. (p. 84)

SOURCE: *Bissell I*

STAFF: *Basic*

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES  
(Assassination)

**TOP SECRET**

CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he could envision two circumstances in which assassinations would be justified. First, on proper orders from the proper highest authorities in cases of utter necessity to eliminate a threat to the security of this country. (22) As an example, he mentioned that it might be necessary to eliminate a Cuban leader to protect the United States against possible attacks by Soviet missiles. (22-23)

HARVEY also believed that assassination would be proper in the case of treason, where not eliminating the person might lead to the loss of many lives or of a life more important than that of the person to be sacrificed. (23) He clarified that these were solely his personal opinions and have nothing to do with the policy of the Agency. (23)

HARVEY testified that he believed authorization for assassinations should come from

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 22-26

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

**TOP SECRET**

CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

the President. (24) He was less certain as to whether Presidential approval was necessary for the assassination of treasonous persons, such as key agents within the Soviet Union on whose information the CIA was dependent for its own security. (25)

*in 1966 - ~~not dependent~~*

HARVEY emphasized that in the case of threats to national security, assassinations should always be authorized by the President. In the case of assassinations necessary to protect the resources of the Agency, he felt that authority might better be derived from parties other than the President to keep the President in a "credibly deniable position." (26)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:HARVEY, William  
DUNLOP, Sgt.GENERAL THEMES   
(General Assassination Policy)OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had no knowledge of American assassinations of a defected agent, either a defected American agent, or defected agents who were third-country nationals. (19) He further knew of no instance of the United States' assassinating any person who was a non-political leader. (19-20)

HARVEY testified that he knew of no attempt to assassinate SGT. DUNLOP. (20)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 19-20STAFF: RheaFILE:DATE: 30.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Chou En Lai  
ColbyDATES:'55  
'56CATEGORIES:

Castro

General Themes OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified that no CIA involvement with 2 reported attempts to assassinate Chou En Lai in '55 and '56 (Tr. 11-12)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. C. Colby on 5/23/75

STAFF: John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL, Richard  
TWEEDY, BronsonDATES:

late 1960

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETEXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE  
GENERAL THEMES ✓  
CONGO

WIROGUE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that the philosophy described by the Chief of the CIA Africa Division, probably BRONSON TWEEDY, in a memorandum in late 1960, was probably applicable to matters within the scope of Project ZRRIFLE. The memorandum recommended the agent WIROGUE in these terms: "He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions" (59).

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: BISSELL, IISTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Dulles  
BisseeDATES:

9/60

CATEGORIES:

General Themes

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question about whether the use of circumlocutions to describe an assassination operation resulted from a malaise of conscience, BISSELL replied, "I don't think it grated against my conscience. I think it may have been a feeling that the Director /ALLEN DULLES/ preferred the use of the sort of language that is described in the IG Report." (25).

SOURCE:

Bissee I

FILE:**TOP SECRET**STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:  
Breckinridge

DATES:  
late April  
1961

CATEGORIES:  
General Themes (auth)  
Castro  
(termination of Phase I)

Breckinridge testified that as far as Phase I was concerned he had no evidence that the CIA had been acting as an instrument of policy. (33) —

NOTE: This phrase "instrument of policy" is taken from the end of the IG REPORT on page 132. It seems to indicate that, based on his research for the IG REPORT, BRECKINRIDGE concluded that there was no authorization outside the CIA for the Phase I assassination plot against CASTRO.

BRECKINRIDGE said that "no specific instruction" (33) was given. Specifically in response to a question from Sen. BAKER, BRECKINRIDGE said that the Inspector General has no record of any authorization for the Phase I gambling-syndicate assassination plot by the White House, the President, or the Department of Defense (33).

SOURCE:

FILE:

Breckinridge  
Testimony

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge  
Castro  
CIA-Mafia  
Phase II

DATES:

April 1962

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO  
MONGOOSE  
SGA  
GENERAL THEMES (authorization)

OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE testified that in preparing the Inspector General's report of 1967, he found no evidence of specific authorization for Phase II for the CIA-Mafia plot against CASTRO from outside the CIA. (43-44)

HUP SPOT

SOURCE:  
Breckinridge Testimony

FILE:

STAFF:  
Báron

DATE:  
7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ROSELLI

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO  
GENERAL THEME ✓

OCCURRENCE:

ROSELLI testified that there was never any suggestion from the CIA that what he was doing was illegal nor that if he got in trouble with law enforcement agencies it would be taken care of. (65)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: ROSELLI TESTIMONY

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

~~JIM GARRISON~~  
EDWARD MORGAN  
ROSELLI  
JIM O'CONNELL  
KENNEDY, John F.

March 1963

CASTRO  
JFK ASSASSINATION  
GENERAL THEMES

P. 1 of 2

The I.G. Report of 1967 indicated that JIM GARRISON, EDWARD MORGAN, and JOHN ROSELLI were all in Las Vegas at the same time in March of 1960. According to JIM O'CONNELL, "Garrison was in touch with Roselli". (120)

**TOP SECRET**

The I.G. Report commented:

"The Roselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that CASTRO had something to do with the KENNEDY assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that CASTRO actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this." (120)

SOURCE: I.G. Report 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:**TOP SECRET**

P. 2 of 2

Discovery Leads

1. Did the CIA ever disclose this line of reasoning to the Warren Commission or to anyone outside the CIA?
2. Should Garrison be interviewed or Roselli questioned about this contact?  
(ATTENTION: DAVID AARON)
3. (ATTENTION: RICK INDERFRUTH) Whether or not this line of reasoning can be substantiated, demonstrates the CIA's general awareness that American assassination plotting may breed assassination attempts against American leaders.  
(GENERAL THEMES)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Breckinridge  
IG REPORTDATES:

5/23/67

4/25/67

CATEGORIES:CASTRO  
GENERAL THEMESOCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE said that the introductory memorandum to the IG REPORT of 1967, which was dated April 25, 1967, implicitly reached the conclusion that assassination was "not desirable". (19) He points to the statement: "Elimination of the dominate figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government." (4) Second, the memorandum made the point that "There is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination" (5) In a covert action to bring about the fall of a government, implying that assassination is not desirable.

SOURCE:

Breckinridge Testimony

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:~~TOP SECRET~~

DATE: 7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:~~J. S. EARMAN~~  
SAM PAPICH  
HARVEY  
ROSELLI  
GIANCANADATES:

May 3, 1967

CATEGORIES:CASTRO  
GENERAL THEMESOCCURRENCE:~~TOP SECRET~~

P. 1 of 2

With regard to the FBI's knowledge of the gambling syndicate assassination plot, the I.G. Report of 1967 noted: "They should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assassination of CASTRO and used U.S. gangster elements in the operation." (131)

On May 3, 1967 J. S. EARMAN, Inspector General of the CIA, met with SAM PAPICH of the FBI and told PAPICH of an expected meeting between ROSELLI and HARVEY. PAPICH commented "that ROSELLI and GIANCANA have CIA 'over a barrel' because of 'that operation'. He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either ROSELLI or GIANCANA because of 'their previous activities with your people.' (131)" (continued)

SOURCE: I.G. Report 1967STAFF: Baron

Breckinridge  
IG REPORT

DATES:

5/23/67

4/25/67

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO  
GENERAL THEMES

OCCURRENCE:

BRECKINRIDGE said that the introductory memorandum to the IG REPORT of 1967, which was dated April 25, 1967, implicitly reached the conclusion that assassination was "not desireable". (19) He points to the statement: "Elimination of the dominate figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government." (4) Second, the memorandum made the point that "There is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination" (5) In a covert action to bring about the fall of a government, implying that assassination is not desirable.

SOURCE:

Breckinridge Testimony

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:

**TOP SECRET**

DATE: 7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:  
May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

GENERAL THEMES

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. Report of 1967 acknowledges that there is an inherent incompleteness to CIA internal investigation of CIA operations involving personnel outside the Agency:

"If an independent investigation were to be ordered, the investigators could learn everything that we have learned. Such an investigation probably would uncover details unknown to us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants." (132)

Discovery Leads

ATTENTION: RICK INDERFURTH

SOURCE: I.G. Report 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

May 23, 1967

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO  
GENERAL THEMES

OCCURRENCE:

~~TOP SECRET P. 2 OF 2~~

In the conclusion to the I.G. Report of 1967, the following action alternatives were considered:

1. "Try to silence those who are talking or might later talk."(128)
2. "Plausibly deny that we plotted with gangster elements to assassinate Castro" (131)
3. "State or imply that it [CIA] was merely an instrument of policy" (132)

In this case each of the alternatives was rejected. But the format seems to indicate that such alternatives are considered frequently by the CIA in dealing with the disclosure or potential disclosure of a covert operation.

(Continued)

SOURCE:

I.G. Report of 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

ENTC. MCLION /  
2 RIFLE

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:HARVEY, William  
SILVER, Arnold  
BISSELL, Richard

26 Jan. 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with ARNOLD SILVER about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52) HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with ARNOLD SILVER. (52)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52STAFF: RheaFILE:DATE: 30.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:HARVEY, William  
HEIMS, Richard  
BISSELL, Richard

Spring 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that after he had examined the possibility of the CIA's carrying out assassinations, he reported his conclusions to HEIMS and BISSELL. He testified that he discussed the matter with HEIMS shortly after he had been given the assignment of looking into the assassination matter and that they talked about HARVEY's grave doubts, reservations, and problems concerning this kind of operation. (42)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 42

STAFF: RheaDATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

Bissell

5/61

Cuba  
Executive Action

Referring to the White House requests for establishing an Executive Action program, Bissell said: "What they contemplated is action that would be conducted through the clandestine service in the regular channel. What they meant by an Executive Action capability, of course, embraced a great deal more than assassination. It embraced means of discrediting a political leader, possibly means of physically incapacitating him, but without permanent injury, possibly assassination as last resort." (p. 57).

Bissell indicated, however, that this was not said directly to him in those terms and was an assumption on his part

(p. 58).

Bissell /

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:Greer  
Bissell  
White House'62-'63  
5-9-73Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified Ex. A, Project ZR Rifle, The "Ken Greer Document," (Tr. 85), is correct in its statement that "the White House urged Richard Bissell to create an executive action capability," (Tr. 86) and that one of its purposes was a general standby capability to carry out assassinations."(Tr. 86)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell  
Bundy  
Rostow

DATES:

5/61

CATEGORIES:

Cuba  
2 R/RIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In reference to the initial White House requests for establishment of an assassination capability to be known as Executive Action, Bissell testified "Very probably one of those two [Bundy or Rostow] or both of those White House staff members would have discussed it with me." (p. 54).

SOURCE: Bissell i

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BISSELL

DATES:

May 1960

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

"The plan of the capability I could have done on my own or ordered on my own." (p. 79).

Note: Here BISSELL is answering a question about whether he had the authority to establish such a program without instructions from the WHITE HOUSE.

SOURCE:

BISSELL i

STAFF: Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL  
ROSTOWDATES:

May 1960

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Although BISSELL maintains that he does not remember specific conversations in which the WHITE HOUSE urged him to create an Executive Action capability, he has testified: "I believe that I did have conversations, at least with Mr. ROSTOW about the creation of a capability." (p. 81).

"In other words, it may have been initiated within the Agency, it could have been, but I believe that if so, I talked to him about it." (p. 81).

SOURCE:

BISSELL I

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE:

July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bissell

DATES:

5/61

CATEGORIES:Cuba  
Executive ActionOCCURRENCE:

Bissell testified that the Executive Action project did not only represent an assassination capability but "it is a capability to secure the removal from office or to render powerless or in some other way to frustrate figures, usually political figures that are considered or whose activities are considered contrary to the interests of the United States." (p. 68).

SOURCE:

Bissell I

STAFF:

Baron

SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:BISSELL  
CASTRO

May 1961

ZR ✓  
RIFLE  
EXECUTIVE ACTIONOCCURRENCE: CARD 1 of 2

Despite Bissell's statement that he does not remember requests from the White House to set up his ZR/RIFLE assassination capability, he states later in his testimony: "I interpreted this as a request to develop a different kind of a capability which would have been appropriate for the clandestine service and of a wholly different sort from that being used in the so-called First Phase against CASTRO. " (p. 53).

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF:

Baron

FILE:DATE: July 3, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION OF IG REPORT

Card 2 of 2

Con

OCC

Bissell recalls that this is true (p. 49), but he cannot remember who in the White House made this request (p. 49). Bissell places this request in early 1961. (p. 50). Bissell remembers assigning William Harvey the task of developing the Executive Action program, but he does not remember the requests from the White House (p. 50). Bissell suggests that the requests might have come from Bundy (p. 49) or Walt Rostow (p. 51). Bissell does not deny the truth of the quote from Harvey that he, Bissell, stated that he received two requests from the White House to set up the ZRRIFLE assassination capability. But he does not remember specific conversations (p. 51).

SOURCE:

STAFF.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL  
BUNDY  
ROSTOWDATES:  
Early 1961CATEGORIES:  
EXECUTIVE ACTION CARD 1 of 3  
OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that shortly after the advent of the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION there were weekly luncheon meetings in the STATE DEPARTMENT with BUNDY and ROSTOW in attendance representing the WHITE HOUSE, BISSELL in attendance from the CIA, and one or two people from the Departments of STATE and DEFENSE, roughly at the Assistant Secretary level. No minutes were kept. They were occasions for discussing without agenda whatever topics were brought out. (p. 81-82).

SOURCE:

BISSELL I

FILE#:STAFF:

Baron

DATE: July 3, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that the proposal for an Executive Action project at those luncheon meetings was "exactly the sort of thing that could have happened, and this is the kind of place where I think that it probably was proposed." (p. 82).

He said further that assuming there were two requests from the WHITE HOUSE, they could have come at successive meetings of this sort. (p. 82).

BISSELL indicated that he might have made reports on the developments in the Executive Action program at these luncheon meetings, but "as I normally operated I would replied more particularly to ROSTOW in this case." (p. 82). (Continued)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CONTINUATION CARD 3 OF 3

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL said that he had the feeling that he did report in this way to Mr. ROSTOW (p. 83).

Note: This card contains two discreet subjects: (1) Formulation of the Executive Action plan, and (2) Reporting to ROSTOW on the Executive Action program.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Helms, Richard

**HARVEY**

1961

Executive Action

Castro

**ZR Rifle**

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the Z R Rifle effort to assassinate Castro the other general efforts to "eliminate Castro or dispose of Castro" were likely distinctive programs (52). Helms testified that the reference to the IG efforts stating that he authorized Harvey to handle the Z R Rifle project on a special basis was correct. Such authorization was necessary because of the accounting system of the CIA which required an officer's signature for disbursements in sensitive operations (54).

SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he remembered ZR Rifle. He particularly remembered his desire to end the project and to see if the hit man ~~could~~ be used ~~in~~ some other useful way. ~~ZR RIFLE~~ was eventually terminated two or three years later. Helms testified he did not remember the man's name or his nationality. He did not like the idea and finally phased it out. (53) Helms testified that he considered Z R Rifle a "tiny little thing". (52)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

1961

Executive Action

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that there was no doubt that one of the purposes of Z R Rifle was to establish a capability for assassinating foreign leaders. (54-55) Helms could not recall hearing discussions regarding setting up a capability for the assassination of Castro. (55) He could recall know overlap between the Castro assassination programs and Z R Rifle (55).

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge  
Helms  
Harvey  
Bissell  
Castro

DATES:

'61 - '62  
~~'62~~

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Helms "signed off on a project that was originally initiated by Mr. Bissell called ZR Rifle, and ZR Rifle was a project that Mr. Bissell was quoted as saying was at the urgency (sic) of the White House." (Tr. 66) "ZR Rifle was described as an executive action capability, a capability to permit assassination if someone called for them". (Tr. 66-67) "Mr. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr. Bissell and originally it continued as a separate action from the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given that responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became wedded." (Tr. 67)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

John Bayly

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge  
Helms

DATES:

'61 - '62  
~~'62~~

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle... (which) had a dual purpose... to steal codes" and to provide lethal executive action capability. (Tr. 67, 69-70) Rifle meant rifle (gun) and rifle (rummage through files). [Tr. 67]

TOP SECRET//SI

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

PERSONS/ENTITIES:McCone  
Bay of PigsDATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE Testified that the Executive Action Plan was not called off after the Bay of Pigs. He state that this was understandable because this was a planning operation. It was not an authorized action operation (42)

~~TOP SECRET~~SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE: 6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY, WILLIAM  
BISSELL, RICHARDDATES:

early 1961

CATEGORIES:

CASTRO

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that the following events led him to believe that the White House had approved, at least in principle, the operation to assassinate Castro. First, he had a conversation early in 1961 with Bissell, when Bissell told him that, on one or more occasions, he had been urged by the White House to see that the Agency developed an Executive Action capability.(80) Bissell referred to the White House only in general, and did not name specific individuals. (81)

Harvey testified that he believed that if the White House had given a "generalized approval, in principle," then the CIA would have been acting within its authority to mount a specific operation against Castro." (82) He further testified that he could conceive of situations, including assassinations, where "no one would want to charge the President, personally, with the complete dirty-handed details of it." (82)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 80-82.STAFF: RheaDATE: 6/30/75~~TOP SECRET~~FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William

K. J. ~~K. J.~~ QJWIN

SILVER, Arnold

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that Q.J.Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through ARNOLD SILVER for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the people spotted by Q.J.Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was used only once in connection with an operation in the Congo, which was not an assassination operation. (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 50-51FILE:STAFF: RheaDATE: 30.6.75**TOP SECRET**PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

HARVEY, William

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that the EXECUTIVE ACTION PROGRAM was a synonym for assassination. (10)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 10FILE:STAFF: RheaDATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Colby, Wm. E.

DATES:

IX - C - 2 - b

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question from Senator Huddleston which asked who was the lowest ranking official in the CIA who could authorize assassination attempt and have the ability to have action taken on it and funds supplied, etc., Colby stated "I doubt that I could give you a formal answer to that, Senator." He indicated that it was such a serious matter it could only be approved at a very high level including the Director. He further indicated that he cannot imagine the Director giving this authority without having some \_\_\_\_\_ (37). (Interrupted by further question, answer incomplete.)

SOURCE:

FILE:

SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75

Cage

STAFF:

JFD

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE

Higher Authority

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE was asked whether the Executive Action was an instance of a section of the CIA below his level acting without his authority or whether in fact there was Presidential authority authorizing it and MCCONE had been kept in the dark. MCCONE responded that the actions taken under the authority of the Executive Action Plan were not under "direction from higher authority" (43) MCCONE stated that his answer was purely speculation. (43)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE  
HARVEYDATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓  
CASTROOCCURRENCE:

MCCONE testified that he "never knew of the Executive Action Plan (42). In describing lack of supervision in HARVEY's activities, MCCONE testified "for several months Mr. HARVEY was in charge of the Executive Action Plan. Just what he did I don't know but this I am told. I never knew of the Executive Action Plan and was never briefed on it, I was never told about it to my memory or any record on it. Then Mr. HARVEY was moved over in charge of the Cuban operation and I think whatever action he took -- I have hear of two or three, all of which were abortive and in my opinion stupid -- he did it under what he thought was the authority of the Executive Action Plan but not any -- to my knowledge -- any direction of higher authority" (42) MCCONE testified that the Executive Action Plan was a subject on which he could only speculate (42)

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

**TOP SECRET**STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

6/27/75

FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE described the Executive Action Plan as follows: "An Executive Action Plan in the jargon of the intelligence world means a plan for removal by any means of an undesirable head of state or senior person in a country. It doesn't necessarily mean an assassination. It might mean setting them up onthe Riveira with a blonde and swiss bank account but getting rid of them." (41)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:STAFF:

Rhea

DAM

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

**HARVEY**DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:Executive Action  
Castro  
**ZR Rifle ✓**

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the Z R Rifle effort to assassinate Castro and the other general efforts to "eliminate Castro or dispose of Castro" were wholly distinctive programs (52). Helms testified that the reference to the IG reports stating that he authorized Harvey to handle the Z R Rifle project on a special basis was correct. Such authorization was necessary because of the accounting system of the CIA which required an officer's signature for disbursements in sensitive operations (54).

SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE: 6/28/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:Executive Action  
**ZR Rifle ✓**

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he remembered ZR Rifle. He particularly remembered his desire to end the project and to see if the hit man could be used to some other useful way. ~~ZR RIFLE~~ was eventually terminated two or three years later. Helms testified he did not remember the man's name or his nationality. He did not like the idea and finally phased it out. (53) Helms testified that he considered Z R Rifle a "tiny little thing". (52)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Helms 6/13/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:Breckinridge      Castro  
Bissell  
Harvey  
MafiaDATES:'61 - '62  
'62CATEGORIES:Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Bissell told Harvey to create the executive action capability" and to take over the Castro assassination attempt, which was connected with a continuing relationship between the CIA and the Mafia." (Tr. 71)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

FILE:DATE: 7/2/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Harvey  
ColbyDATES:

'61 - '62

CATEGORIES:Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified "Mr. Harvey was... very effective..." (Tr. 90)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

FILE:DATE: 7/2/75

Silver, Arnold  
Harvey, William  
Bissell, Richard

DATES:  
1/26/61

CATEGORIES:  
EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver (52)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY  
K. G. WIN

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle state "4. Operational Assets:  
(1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg , in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted spreatically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:  
K. G. Win annual salary \$7,200

Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates \$2,000  
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates \$2,000

Hire of safe houses and other automobile expenses \$1,000

Total \$14,700

Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrriffle \$2,000

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

zr Rife ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives": The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed." (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

zr Rife ✓

OCCURRENCE:

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

Harvey 6/25/75

DATE: Rhea

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL, Richard  
QJWIN  
HARVEY  
ZRRIFLEDATES:

Feb, 1961

CATEGORIES:TOP SECRET  
EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓  
CONGOOCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testified that he did not have any personal recollection of who QJWIN was, although he says that he probably was informed at the time if HARVEY recruited him for ZRRIFLE (58).

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: BISSELL, IISTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:ZRRIFLE  
QJWIN  
SILVER, Arnold  
LUMUMBA, PatriceO'DONNELL, Justin  
BISSELL, RichardDATES:May 1961  
February 19, 1962  
*Feb., 1961*CATEGORIES:TOP SECRET  
EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓*ZRRIFLE*OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~████████~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38STAFF: Baron

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> |                   | <u>DATES:</u>   | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>                              |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|---|
| BISSELL, Richard         | O'DONNELL, Justin | FEB<br>May 1961 | TOP SECRET<br>EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE<br>CONGO |
| HARVEY, William          | BRECKENRIDGE, S.  |                 |   |
| <del>SILVER</del>        | HELMS, Richard    |                 |   |
| SILVER, Arnold           | QJWIN             |                 |   |
| LUMUMBA, Patrice         |                   |                 |   |
| OCCURRENCE:              |                   |                 |   |

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

| <u>SOURCE:</u>           | I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38 | <u>STAFF:</u>     | Baron              |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| <u>FILE:</u>             |                         | <u>DATE:</u>      | 28.6.75            |
| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u> |                         | <u>DATES:</u>     | <u>CATEGORIES:</u> |
| ZRRIFLE                  | O'DONNELL, Justin       | May 1961          | TOP SECRET         |
| QJWIN                    | BISSELL, Richard        | February 19, 1962 | EXECUTIVE ACTION   |
| SILVER, Arnold           |                         | Feb., 1961        | ZRRIFLE            |
| LUMUMBA, Patrice         |                         |                   | LUMUMBA            |
| OCCURRENCE:              |                         |                   |                    |

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~two~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

TOP SECRET

|                |                         |               |         |
|----------------|-------------------------|---------------|---------|
| <u>SOURCE:</u> | I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38 | <u>STAFF:</u> | Baron   |
| <u>FILE:</u>   |                         | <u>DATE:</u>  | 28.6.75 |

DISPOSITION BY DATE

DATE

BAKER  
BISSELL  
HARVEY  
ROSTOW

May 1961

ZR  
RIFLE  
EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Card 1 of 2

Senator Baker asked Bissell to comment upon the section of the IG Report of 21 May 1973 which says: "Early in the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, the White House urged Richard Bissell to create an Executive Action capability, that is, a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations." (p. 48).

SOURCE:

IG REPORT  
1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Bissell

5/61

Cuba  
ZR/RIFLE

"Project named ZR/RIFLE first appears in the files in May 1961 although the first recorded approval is 19 May 1962." (p. 48).

This is a quote from the document entitled Nine Pages from the Inspector General, 21 May 1973.

Note: Check this quote against the original document. It is important to locate the document referred to as "the first recorded approval" for ZR/RIFLE in order to determine whether the White House requests for the establishment of an assassination capability was first made in May 1961, as I have assumed here, or around May 1962. Note further that all of my references to the initial White House requests for the establishment of ZR/RIFLE have been filed under May 1961.

Risell Baron

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>             | <u>DATES:</u> | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>  |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---|
| BAKER<br>BISSELL<br>HARVEY<br>ROSTOW | May 1961      | ER<br>RIFLE<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXECUTIVE ACTION |

OCCURRENCE: Card 1 of 2

Senator Baker asked Bissell to comment upon the section of the IG Report of 21 May 1973 which says: "Early in the KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION, the White House urged Richard Bissell to create an Executive Action capability, that is, a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations." (p. 48).

|                                     |                           |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <u>SOURCE:</u><br>IG REPORT<br>1967 | <u>STAFF:</u><br>Baron    |
|                                     | <u>DATE:</u> July 3, 1975 |

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u><br>Dulles | <u>DATES:</u><br>late 1961 | <u>CATEGORIES:</u><br>Executive Action ✓<br>MONSIEUR Castro |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------|---|
| MCCONE<br>HELMS<br>CABELL<br>MAHEU |                            |   |

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE testified that he had no knowledge that at any time prior to his assumption of the Directorship of the CIA that the CIA had been given authority to be involved in assassination plots (68). He testified that he had no knowledge of who had initiated the MAHEU operation or carried it out and that he had never known of the Executive Action Plan. He also denied knowledge of other abortive assassination attempts against CASTRO, although he presumed they were carried under the authority of the Executive Action Plan. He had never discussed with DULLES or General CABELL or HELMS whether there had ever been any grant authority to the CIA to plan assassination. (68)

**TOP SECRET**

|                                    |                         |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <u>SOURCE:</u><br>McCone Testimony | <u>STAFF:</u><br>Rhea   |
| <u>FILE:</u>                       | <u>DATE:</u><br>6/28/75 |

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

VZR

RIFLE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division DD, issued a memorandum for Cable Secretariat, the subject of which was "Distribution -- ZR/RIFLE Traffic," which indicated that two copies of all cable traffic concerning ZR/RIFLE were to be delivered to Harvey, and no other distribution was to be made.

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF:

Baron

DATE:

July 3, 1975

FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

May 24, 1961

CATEGORIES:

VZR

RIFLE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division DD, issued a memorandum for Cable Secretariat, the subject of which was "Distribution -- ZR/RIFLE Traffic," which indicated that two copies of all cable traffic concerning ZR/RIFLE were to be delivered to Harvey, and no other distribution was to be made.

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>                | <u>DATES:</u> | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>           |
|---|---------------|------------------------------|
| HARVEY<br>MCCONE<br>FITZGERALD, DESMOND | 1962          | CASTRO<br>EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓ |

OCCURRENCE:

In response to a question as to how HARVEY could have continued the Executive Action Plan without MCCONE's knowledge, MCCONE replied "I think he was reporting at that time to DESMOND FITZGERALD who in turn reported to Mr. HELMS." (49)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

MCCONE

1962

MONGOOSE  
CASTRO  
EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE was asked how assassination attempts could have taken place without his knowledge. He replied that it was very disturbing to him to learn of these assassination attempts "but I think the reason it went on was it <sup>was</sup> under an authority that was granted before I took office, But that is not an excuse" (47)

*was ok'd*

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

McCone Testimony

FILE:

STAFF:

Rhea

DATE:

POLICY/ENTITIES.

DATES.

CATEGORIES.

TOP SECRET

BISSELL, Richard  
HELMS, Richard

February 1962

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL believes that he told HELMS about Project ZRRIFLE at the time of HELMS' succession as DDP.

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: BISSELL, II (53)

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Cubella  
Breckinridge  
Castro

63  
64  
65

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80) or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA, "assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been the objective." (Tr. 80)

SOURCE:

in memory of G.W. Colby 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

Breckinridge  
Castro  
Harvey

2-63

Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "the Mafia connection from beginning to end was an attempt to assassinate Castro. The operation was called off finally in the Spring, perhaps February of 1963." (Tr. 72)

Harvey called off Mafia operation (Tr. 72-73)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Dulles  
Colby

DATES:

6-63

CATEGORIES:

ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby testified "the indication (is) that Mr. Dulles did know of this act (ZR Rifle project to carry out assassination) at the time." (June, 1963) (Tr. 88) (Tr. 87-88)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William  
Chief, FI Staff, CIA  
QJWIN

DATES:

27 June 1963

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRE

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, "stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41) ~~On 21 April 1964 QJWIN was terminated by the Langley Station.~~

# TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

STAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella  
Fitzgerald  
Harvey  
Artimo

DATES:

~~01~~  
~~14~~  
11-22-65  
2-64  
(2-65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused it. In Feb. '64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid (Artimo?) after arms catches put down off Cuban Coast. (Tr. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

John ...

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella  
Breckinridge  
Castro

DATES:

'63  
'64  
'65

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80) or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA, "assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been the objective." (Tr. 80)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella  
Fitzgerald  
Harvey  
Artimo

DATES:

61  
1963  
11-22-63  
2-64  
(2-65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused it. In Feb. '64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid (Artimo?) after arms catches put down off Cuban Coast. (Tr. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

SOURCE:STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella  
Breckinridge  
Castro

DATES:

'63  
'64  
(65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that "Cubella was a man who was high in the Castro government, he was a man who represented a dissatisfied element," (Tr. 80) or so CIA thought. (Tr. 82-83) In general, in the past, for the CIA, "assassination became a consideration, but assassination had not been the objective." (Tr. 80)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:STAFF:

John Bayly

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Cubella  
Fitzgerald  
Harvey  
Artine

DATES:

10-  
Mar-63  
11-22-63  
2-64  
(2-65)

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Orlando Cubella, disaffected Cuban major, talked with Harvey's (perhaps) successor Fitzgerald about obtaining arms. On 11-22-63, Cubella offered ball point pen usable as a poison syringe in Paris, France. He refused it. In Feb. '64 ('65?), Cubella given weapon by Cuban refugee in Madrid (Artine?) after arms catches put down off Cuban Coast. (Tr. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78)

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

STAFF:

Breckinridge  
Cubella

6-65

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that last contact with Cubella group was 6-65. (Tr. 79)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Breckinridge  
Cubella

DATES:

'75

CATEGORIES:

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Cubella now in jail on Isle of Pines. (Tr. 98)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William  
BISSELL, Richard  
HELMS, Richard

DATES:

Spring 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY summarized the thrust of BISSELL's conversation with him concerning setting up an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY: "I have been charged by the WHITE HOUSE with the development of an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY. Will you please survey it and see what you can do about it and tell me what you can do about it." (44)

To the best of his knowledge, HELMS knew nothing about the program. (44) As far as HARVEY could recall, HELMS did not know about the program until he briefed HELMS about the fact that he had been given the assignment by BISSELL. (44)

HARVEY testified that after he reported back to BISSELL, explaining his generally negative assessment of the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY, that he was instructed to continue and at least make reasonable efforts to see what the CIA had in the way of assets without communicating his objectives outside of a limited circle within the intelligence agency. (45) Aside from determining if the CIA had an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY, he was instructed to at least attempt to develop a capability for possible stand-by use. (45) (con't)

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY

**TOP SECRET**FILE:STAFF:

Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that to the best of his knowledge during the entire EXECUTIVE ACTION project, no agent or officer who had not been in on the project at the time of its inception was told about it; no operation was ever mounted; and no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassination; and no tentative targeting list was ever drawn up. (45)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT  
HARVEY, WILLIAMDATES:

2/61

CATEGORIES:CASTRO  
 EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (80) of the Project was to steal codes rather than to develop the capability for assassination. (30)

Breckinridge testified that on the face of the documents relating to Project ZRRIFLE, the Project was only directed at stealing codes. The fact that it related to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviews with William Harvey. (31)

~~TOP SECRET~~SOURCE: BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 6/2/75STAFF: WALLACHFILE:DATE: 7/5/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richard

DATES:

1961

CATEGORIES:

Executive Action

Castro  
ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that there was no doubt that one of the purposes of the Helms program was to establish a capability for assassinating foreign leaders. Helms could not recall hearing discussions regarding setting up a capability for the assassination of Castro. (55) He could recall some overlap between the Castro assassination programs and Z R Rifle (55).

~~TOP SECRET~~

| <u>PERSONS/ENTITIES:</u>                                    | <u>DATES:</u>                              | <u>CATEGORIES:</u>                                      |
|---|--|---|
| BISSELL, Richard<br>HARVEY<br>WHITE HOUSE<br>SILVER, Arnold | February 1961<br>(HARVEY's rough estimate) | EXECUTIVE ACTION /ZKRIFLE<br>CASTRO<br><del>CONGO</del> |

OCCURRENCE:

the

BISSELL assigns to HARVEY / developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability, i.e., a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with ARNOLD SILVER and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

card 1 of 2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

**TOP SECRET**

CARD 2 of 2

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

DATES:

feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

*RUES states that*

Sometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

BISSELL, Richard  
Harvey

DATES:

August  
1960

CATEGORIES:

CUBA  
(Executive Action)  
 ZR/RIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

Bissell testified that he assigned Harvey the task of establishing an Executive Action project (p. 73).

Bissell said that his initial conversation with Harvey about establishing the Executive Action program did not include a request to direct this program toward Cuba (p. 74).

However, Bissell indicates that Harvey's note is accurate that on 11/16/61 Harvey discussed with Bissell "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba." (p. 74).

SOURCE: BISSELL TESTIMONY

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/3/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

EY  
ELL

DATES:

CATEGORIES:  
EXECUTIVE ACTION

**TOP SECRET**

OCCURRENCE:

They testified that BISSELL had never specified targets for the Executive Action  
am (133) BISSELL

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY, William  
BISSELL, Richard  
WHITE HOUSEDATES:

Spring, 1961

February, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

**TOP SECRET**OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that during his initial conversation with BISSELL about EXECUTIVE ACTION, BISSELL stated that the WHITE HOUSE had urged him to develop an EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY. (37) On further reflection, he was not certain whether BISSELL had said that the WHITE HOUSE had urged him personally or whether it had simply urged other persons within the organization to look into the matter. (37) HARVEY did not know who in the WHITE HOUSE had done the urging. (37)

HARVEY testified that during that meeting, BISSELL asked him to explore and assess the field of assassination and the attendant problems and restrictions and requirements, and implied that the program would continue into an attempt to develop an assassination capability. (37-A).

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 37 - 37-A

STAFF: RheaFILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY, William  
BISSELL, RichardDATES:

Spring, 1961

February, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

**TOP SECRET**OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with BISSELL in which BISSELL asked him to investigate a capability for EXECUTIVE ACTION. He had assumed the conversation took place in the Spring of 1961, although, after having reviewed materials presented to him by the Committee, he felt that it probably took place in February 1961.

HARVEY testified that during this conversation, BISSELL said that he was concerned about the CIA's capabilities to perform EXECUTIVE ACTION and about the various protections, methods, techniques, decisions, and judgments as to its advisability. (34-35) HARVEY did not recall whether BISSELL used the word "assassination," but he did say that "the implication was so clear as to be beyond any misunderstanding." (35)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 34-35STAFF: RheaFILE:DATE: 30.6.75

HELMS, William  
HELMS, Richard  
BISSELL, Richard  
CIA-Cuba Task Force

EDWARDS  
CASTRO, Fidel

Nov. 15, 1961

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET  
CUBA -- SYNDICATE/PHASE II

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

CARD 1 OF 2

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY discusses with BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE/EXECUTIVE ACTION program to Cuba.  
HELMS places HARVEY in charge of the CIA-Cuba Task Force.

"HARVEY has a note that on that date he discussed with BISSELL the application of the ZRRIFLE program to Cuba. HARVEY says that BISSELL instructed him to take over EDWARDS' contact with the CRIMINAL SYNDICATE and thereafter to run the operation against CASTRO." (39)

HARVEY adds: "Shortly after this discussion with BISSELL, he was told by HELMS that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba Task Force." (39)

NOTE: After this card is used for the Cuba Chronology, it should be used as well in the EXECUTIVE ACTION chronology.

Late 1961-early 1962 HARVEY engages in daily meetings concerning Cuba operations. (39-40)  
About this time Cuba operations of the CIA were known as Task Force W ~~the up~~. (40) (cont)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 39-40.

**TOP SECRET**

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 OF 2

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY indicated that he ran the CASTRO operation as one aspect of ZRRIFLE, handling personally and not using any of the assets being developed in the general ZRRIFLE/EXECUTIVE ACTION program, for which he used agent QJWIN. (40)

IE: Use this entry as well for the heading EXECUTIVE ACTION, as well as CUBA.

**TOP SECRET**

STAFF:

DATE:

SOURCE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELL, Richard  
HARVEY, William  
~~ZR/RIFLE~~DATES:Nov. 16,  
1961CATEGORIES:CUBA  
(Executive Action)

✓ ZR/RIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL testifies that HARVEY's note (I don't know the source at this point) says on 11/16/61 that Harvey discussed with BISSEL "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba." (p. 74).

SOURCE: BISSELL TESTIMONYSTAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 7/3/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:QJWIN  
HELMS  
~~HARVEY~~ HARVEYDATES:

19 Feb 1962

CATEGORIES:ZR  
~~RIFLE~~  
EXECUTIVE ACTIONOCCURRENCE:

On 19 February 1962, Richard Helms, then DDP issued a memorandum for William K. Harvey; Subject: Authorization of ZR/RIFLE Agent Activities.

"For the purpose of ZR/RIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to be in force through 31 December 1962, subject to renewal at that time."

"Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category and by your certification."

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:STAFF:

Baron

DATE: July 3 1975

NCIMS  
Harvey

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET  
February 19, 1962 EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

First recorded approval of ZRRIFLE.

New DD/P HELMS authorized HARVEY by a memorandum "to handle the project on a special basis (38-39) accounting for expenditures would be by general category on HARVEY's certification. (39) Initial approval: \$14,700. (39)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 38-39

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

QJWIN  
LUXEMBOURG STATION  
~~ZRRIFLE~~

DATES:

21 April 1964

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION  
ZRRIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

QJWIN was terminated by the LUXEMBOURG STATION ~~████████~~. (41) on 21 April 1964.

"There is no indication in the file that the EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY of ZRRIFLE/QJWIN was ever used." (41)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Spring 1961  
February, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that after his meeting with BISSELL concerning setting up an EXECUTIVE ACTION PROGRAM, that he discussed, in theoretical terms, with a few officers whom he trusted the whole subject of assassination, including whether assassination was a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and whether it was in the CIA's capability to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (37-A - 38)

He concluded that assassinations could be used only rarely, and then under carefully controlled conditions, and, as a result of the greatest provocation. Secondly, there were several caveats about the technical effectiveness of the CIA in carrying out this type of operation. (38) His ultimate conclusion was that the CIA did not have the assets. There were no staff officers who were capable of this kind of direct action or to whom he would have been willing to delegate authority to carry out such action. (39)

HARVEY testified that he decided that assassinations were generally impracticable and reported his conclusions to both BISSELL and HELMS. (40)

SOURCE:

HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 37-A - 40

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZRRIFLE O'DONNELL, Justin  
QJWIN BISSELL, Richard  
SILVER, Arnold  
LUMUMBA, Patrice

May 1961  
February 19, 1962  
Feb., 1961

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE:

"The project name, ZRRIFLE, first appears in the files in May 1961, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February 1962." (38)

"The EXECUTIVE ACTION ~~program~~ program came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA), to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted)." (38)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY, WILLIAM  
SILVER, ARNOLD.  
KUBARKDATES:Spring, 61  
~~1961~~  
Jan. 26, 1961CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION✓

OCCURRENCE: Harvey was asked about notes written by him and Silver from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way means he should be advised. He should not be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time the Executive Action Project led to specific targeting or specific operation or specific requirement for that purpose. (59)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 2, 1975, pp. 54-59.

~~TOP SECRET~~

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75

FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Harvey, William Gottlieb, Syd

DATES:

1/25/61

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION✓

Castro  
Trujillo Lumumba

OCCURRENCE: Harvey recalled some details of his conversation with Syd Gottlieb on January 25, 1961. It was a general philosophic discussion of assassination and assassination techniques. As Harvey recalled, there was simply a general discussion of assassination as an intelligence service technique and weapon. It was logical for Gottlieb to be present at this discussion, because he had taken over a new job as Chief of the Technical Services Division of the Clandestine Services. As such, the TSD would have been responsible for technical support for assassinations. (54)

The notation in Harvey's notes from that meeting, stating, "last resort beyond last resort, a confession of weakness," was, Harvey recalled, "a sort of concept of operation philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb." (54-55). As Harvey recalled, the logical candidates for assassination at this period were Trujillo, Lumumba, and Castro. They were not being considered as actual targets, but they were three people that might come to mind in conjunction with such an operation (55).

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 54-55.

STAFF: Rhea

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rfile ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "identification: the purpose of project Zrriffle is to spot, develop and use agent assets for division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in the countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The projects will be operated against third country installations and personnel."

**TOP SECRET**

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

ZR Rfile

OCCURRENCE:

**TOP SECRET**

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

ZR Rfile

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "identification: the purpose of project Zrriffle is to spot, develop and use agent assets for division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in the countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The projects will be operated against third country installations and personnel."

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:STAFF:

DATE: Rhea

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ZRRIFLE

DATES:FEB.  
May 1961CATEGORIES:**TOP SECRET**

EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Cover: "Project ZRRIFLE was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop a capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers)." (39)

**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: I.G. REPORT, p. 39STAFF: Baron

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION ✓

ZR Rife

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives". The objectives of this project is the procurement of code decipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the clandestine services, primarily by the NASA security agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division B with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed." (exhibit 1)

Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover of obtaining code and cipher materials. (49)

SOURCE:

Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF:

Rhea

FILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY

K. G. WIN

DATES:

Jan. 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rife ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle state "4. Operational Assets:  
 (1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg , in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For aperiod of a year and a half he was contacted sparcetically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:  
 K. G. Win annual salary \$7,200

Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates \$2,000  
 Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates \$2,000

Hire of safe houses and other automobile expenses \$1,000

Total \$14,700

Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrriffle \$2,000

SOURCE:STAFF: